
EXHIBIT 7

GEORGE M. MAVRIS (SB# 179471)

Attorney at Law 1 Point St. George Place Crescent City, CA 95531 Telephone: (707) 464-1418

Fax: (707) 464-3364



2006 JUL 17 ATTI: 59

CLERK OF THE COURT

BY____ DEPUTY

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF DEL NORTE

No:

In re

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Arcadio Acuna, C-43165,

||Petitioner,

DENIAL TO RESPONDENT'S RETURN

HCPB 05-5242

On Habeas Corpus

Petitioner, Arcadio Acuna, by and through legal counsel responds to the Return filed by Respondent as follows:

- 1. Petitioner admits he is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and is serving three consecutive life sentences following a conviction in Santa Clara County Superior Court.
- 2. Petitioner admits he is not challenging the validity of his conviction, but rather has asserted that he was denied minimal due process requirements relating to the validation process that labeled him a member of a prison gang when confidential information relied on was not disclosed before the validation package was submitted to the LEIU denying Petitioner

 the opportunity to present his view of the material to the actual decision maker.

- 3. Petitioner admits that the CDCR has established a process for validating prisoners as gang members or associates as contained in the Code of Regulations and asserts that the criteria for gang membership as opposed to gang association is clearly distinct and not at all interchangeable.
- 4. Petitioner admits that prisoners validated as members or associates of prison gangs are routinely placed in Administrative Segregation and ordered to serve indeterminate terms in the Pelican Bay State Prison Security Housing Unit (PBSP-SHU).
- 5. Petitioner admits that prisoners may submit to the debriefing process to obtain a "gang drop-out" designation by informing on other prisoners, but denies that prisoners serving indeterminate terms of segregation are considered every 180 days for release to the general population. This court has previously recognized classification committees at PBSP are simply not inclined, or empowered to overturn or even question a prisoner's validation once it has been imposed by the LEIU, and a review of Petitioner's prison file shows that even though he sought, at every opportunity, to have his case reviewed because obvious of due process violations, no classification committee has ever

forwarded his concerns to the IGI for investigation. This writ is the result of those violations.

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- 6. Petitioner admits that he previously served ten years in PBSP-SHU from 1990-2000 after being validated as an associate of a prison gang, and was subsequently released to the general population for four years after being granted "inactive" status in May 2000.
- 7. Petitioner admits that he was told by IGI Lt. Garcilazo in December 2003 that a validation package was being submitted to the LEIU and reasserts that the three source items relied upon were not disclosed in any manner whatsoever prior to the validation package being submitted. Respondents concede that Petitioner was not given an opportunity to present a defense to the specific allegations of gang activity to the actual decision maker (i.e., LEIU) at or prior to the time a decision was to be made. As a matter of fact, the first time Petitioner was ever made aware of the specific charges made against him was on June 16, 2006, when CCII Hawke provided the twenty-seven disclosure forms prior to the interview conducted on June 19, 2006.
- 8. Petitioner denies that a prisoner released to the general population after being granted "inactive" status may be re-validated and returned to the SHU based on one source item.

 Respondent completely misreads or misinterprets the Code of

Regulation's by claiming this court was incorrect in finding that three independent source items are required to validate a prisoner as active by completely ignoring the language of CCR 3378(F)(2), which states: "The procedures relating to the initial validation or rejection of gang members or associates as described in this section {3378(C)(1-8)} shall be followed when reviewing the present status of an inactive gang member or associate."

- 9. Petitioner admits that Respondent's contend that he was re-validated on January 20, 2004, as a member of a prison gang, but denies Respondent's allegation (in Footnote 1) that Petitioner's erroneous validation as a member should have no impact on these proceedings, as ultimately, some two and a half years after being given an indeterminate term of segregation the three source items were properly disclosed and Petitioner was finally given an opportunity to present a defense against allegations of gang activity in June, 2006.
- 10. Petitioner admits that after the validation package was submitted to the LEIU in December 2003, on March 1, 2004, he was transferred to the general population of Calipatria State Prison.

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11. Pétitioner admits that he was placed in Administrative Segregation on March 05, 2004, at Calipatria State Prison when prison officials there were informed Petitioner had been validated as an active member of a prison gang on January 20, 2004.

Petitioner admits he made an appearance before a classification committee at the Calipatria State Prison on March 14, 2004, but denies he expressed no disagreement with committee's decision, that he did not challenge his validation, and denies he made no comments or asked questions during the hearing. In fact, Petitioner strenuously denied involvement in gang activity, brought to the attention of committee members due process violations and advised the committee that IGI Lt. Garcilazo had told Petitioner that if he did not agree to become an informant he was going to send Petitioner back to PBSP-SHU by any means. Unfortunately, as has always been the practice at these hearings, the committee did not record Petitioner's statement nor have any audio recording devices available. Underscoring the fact that Petitioner disagreed with the committee action is the fact that Petitioner, on the very

date that he attended the hearing, filed his very first CDC-602 appeal challenging the validation.

- 13. Petitioner admits he has attended each and every classification committee hearing reviewing his continued segregation, and denies he has never asked questions or made comments at these hearings. A review of the exhibits attached to the initial Petition shows Petitioner has consistently attempted to make his statements part of the official record and yet has been consistently denied.
- 14. Petitioner admits that on March 11, 2004, he submitted a CDC-602 appeal challenging his validation, and asserted that the source items had not been properly disclosed and, further, that he was not a member of a prison gang nor involved in gang activity.
- 15. Petitioner admits that CDC-1030 Disclosure Forms are generally used to disclose confidential information to prisoners.
- 16. Petitioner admits that on April 20, 2004, he was provided with three CDC-1030 forms which described, in ambiguous terms, the allegations of gang activity contained in Petitioner's prison file. Petitioner asserts that the

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first and only time he has ever been provided with specific details of the charges against him was on June 5, 2006, by CCII Hawkes. At that time Petitioner was able to address each of the three source items and show why they did not establish that he had been accepted into actual membership of a gang (a position the Respondent's apparently accept at this point), and why they did not provide a direct link to verifiable acts of aiding and abetting, promoting or furthering gang conduct. CCII Hawkes, by his own admission (see Respondent's Return, Declaration, Exhibit E), indicates that Petitioner is not, nor has he ever been a member of a prison gang.

items relied on in the validation process were disclosed to him on April 20, 2004, via the CDC-1030 Disclosure Forms, he filed three separate CDC-602 appeals challenging each source item as best he could with the limited information that was disclosed. However, Petitioner asserts that he was never interviewed as he should have been during the appeal process and the issues raised in each of the appeals were never addressed. On September 23, 2005, one and a half years after

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the appeals were first filed, the Director denied the appeals stating that there was sufficient evidence to support Petition's validation as an associate of a prison gang. (See Return, Exhibit H).

Petitioner admits that all of the confidential information contained in his prison file was disclosed to him by CCII Hawkes on June 2, 2006, and he was advised a new validation package was being submitted to the LEIU with a recommendation that he be found to be a an active associate of a prison gang based on 27 source items, some dating back almost 20 years, some which had been present in the file when the instant validation was made but not relied upon, and others produced after Petitioner was validated. Petitioner denies that this action afforded him the requisite due process as alleged by Respondent because these habeas proceedings required only that CCII Hawkes review the validations process at issue to determine if the source items relied on were disclosed in accordance with mandatory provisions in the Code of Regulations, and if that evidence, pursuant to specific criteria established Petitioner was properly classified a member of a prison gang. Respondent

urges the Court to rule that -- even if state law was violated -- that it should make no difference as Petitioner may soon be classified as active associate based on the new validation package recently submitted to the LEIU. As mentioned above, Respondent and CCII Hawkes completely misread or misinterpret the regulations relevant to Petitioner's validation and now claim that only one source item is necessary to impose an indeterminate term of segregation. This, of course, is simply not true by the plain language of the statute.

- 19. Petitioner denies that he has not established grounds for habeas relief and, by Respondent's Return, asserts that it has been shown how prison officials, acting in bad faith, and with utter disregard for due process and the Code of Regulations, illegally imposed an indeterminate term of segregation based upon an erroneous decision that Petitioner is a member of a prison gang.
- 20. Petitioner further denies any and all other allegations raised by Respondent that are not specifically admitted herein and asserts that his constitutional right to

be free from long-term segregation has been violated by the actions of prison officials.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Petitioner submits that the Petition should be Granted, Petitioner's validation as a member of a prison gang be held to have been illegally imposed.

Petitioner further argues that the Court should rule the three source items were not properly disclosed and do not establish that Petitioner has been active in gang activity by reference to specific and verifiable acts seen to aid and abet, further or promote a prison gang. In addition, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court Order that Petitioner be released to the general population of a prison commensurate with his proper custody and classification designation.

Respectfully Submitted,

Date:_____

George M. Mavris, Attorney

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Summary of Argument

The Petition for Habeas Corpus relief must be granted on the grounds that (1) Petitioner's due process rights were violated when they failed to provide him with the basis for his gang validation prior to it being submitted to the Law Enforcement Investigations Unit ("LEIU") and (2) Respondent's erroneously conclude that "re-validation" occurs with only one source item as opposed to three. California Code of Regulations 3378(f)(2) provides: "[t]he procedures relating to the initial validation or rejection of gang members or associates described in this section shall be followed when reviewing the present status of an inactive gang member or associate." (emphasis added). Thus, the initial validation, like the review of the inactive status, requires three source items.

A. Due Process Requirements

In prison gang validations, due process requires: (1) prison officials must hold an informal non-adversarial hearing within reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated; (2) prison officials must inform the prisoner of the charges against him or their reasons for considering segregation; and (3) prison officials must allow the prisoner to present his views.

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Toussaint v. McCarthy, 918 F. 2d 1080, 1100-1101 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. Denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 95 Led.2d871, 107 Su. Ct. 2462 (1987) (holding that administrative segregation requires notice of charges and an opportunity to present one's views).

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit requires that the official charged with deciding to retain the inmate in segregation must be the official to whom the inmate presents his views. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 918 F. 2d 752 (9th Cir.1990). The U.S. Supreme Court similarly decided that due process affords prisoners "an opportunity to present his views" to the official "charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administration segregation." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476, 74 L Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983).

Here, Petitioner was validated by the LEIU and then ICC presided over fait accompli decision - as set by 15 CCR Sec. 3341.5(c)(A)(2) - to house Petitioner in the SHU.

Hence, under the requirements of due process, Petitioner must have received notice of the source items used in his validation prior to the decision by LEIU because it was LEIU'S validation, not the subsequent review by ICC, which resulted in an indeterminate SHU term.

Respondents admit that Petitioner was not given notice of the source items until after the validation took place and

similarly, was first afforded the opportunity to present his views at the ICC hearing held long after the validation approval and resultant SHU term was decided.

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The law requires that prison officials also must engage in periodic review of a prisoner's confinement in the SHU that must amount to more than "meaningless gestures." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F .2d 1080, 1104 (9th Cir. 1986); and Toussaint v. Roland, 711 F Supp. 536, 540 n.11 (N.D.Cal. 1989) (citing Toussaint v. Mc Carthy, 801 F 2d. at 1102) see also Morris v. Cambra 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20647 at 3, citing Mims v. Shapp, 744 F. 2d 946, 951-52 (3rd Cir 1984). Here, there is no indication that the ICC did anything more than rubber stamp the decision by the LEIU on the gang validation. Such bogus hearings meet the very definition of a Kangaroo Court: "a term descriptive of a sham legal proceeding in which a person's rights are totally disregarded and in which the result is a foregone conclusion because of the bias of the court or other tribunal." Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition.

B. The "Re-Validation" Process Requires Three Sources

While it is true that --3378(F)(1) does allow for a prisoner

assigned to "inactive" status to be removed from the general

population, with only one source item, this is only the first

step of the process necessary to impose an indeterminate SHU term

for gang activity. Indeed, in clear and unambiguous language, -3378(F)(2) states that once a prisoner has been removed from the
general population "the procedures relating to the initial
validation or rejections of gang members or associates as
described in this section [3378 (c) (1-8)] shall be followed when
reviewing the present status of an inactive gang member or
associate."

In other words, the Court, in issuing the OSC, was correct when it identified that three independent source items are needed to reassign a prisoners "active" status once he has been classified as "inactive."

Because the requisite number of valid source items are lacking, gang validation of Mr. Acuna is inappropriate.

C. Petitioner Has Been Prejudiced by Placement in the SHU Surprisingly, the Respondent devotes a significant portion of the Return to the argument that Petitioner has failed to show how he has been prejudiced by being wrongfully placed in the SHU when, as Respondent argues, he would have ended up there at some point anyway.

It is well settled that placement in Administrative

Segregation poses an "atypical hardship" on an inmate. Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476, 74 L Ed. 2d 675, 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983).

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Placement in the SHU, as outlined in the United States

Supreme Court case of Sandin v. Connor, noted that placement in

the SHU "directly and inevitably affects the duration of a

sentence." 515 U.S. 483, 487. Once confined to the SHU, the

duration of Petitioner's sentence is lengthened because

California Board of Prison Terms refuses to parole any gang

associate. Medina v. Gomez, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12208 at *3.

Petitioner's ability to earn conduct credits is also

significantly curtailed during the period of wrongful confinement
in SHU.

In addition, placement in the SHU deprives an inmate of job placement opportunities, contact visits, educational opportunities as well as the right to many other prison privileges.

It is not rocket science to conclude that Petitioner is prejudiced by being wrongfully held in the SHU for any period of time.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests
the this Petition be Granted, that the Court should declare
that Petitioner's validation as a member of a prison gang be
was illegally imposed. Further, the Court should rule that

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the three source items were not properly disclosed and do not establish that Petitioner has been active in gang activity by reference to specific and verifiable acts seen to aid and abet, further or promote a prison gang.

Finally, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court Order that Petitioner be released to the general population of a prison commensurate with his proper custody and classification designation.

Date:7/17/06

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George M. Mavris, Appointed Counsel

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of the California that

Donna Lema, Declarant

Executed July 17, 2006, at Crescent City, California, by:

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the foregoing is true and correct.

EXHIBIT 8

case, it appears that the most recent documented gang activity (prior to the incidents in question here) was in 1990. The Department Review Board's review of the initial validation document showed that Petitioner "did not have a significant EME role" at that time.

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This raises the question whether after approximately 13 years of no documented gang activity whether it is intended by the regulations, or is appropriate, that only one source be required to revalidate the petitioner.

The Court finds that the failure to provide Form 1030's to petitioner denied petitioner his due process and the ability to voice his views on the source used to revalidate him. There was obvious error in classifying petitioner as a "member" rather than "associate." The initial IGI and LEIU found that two source documents met "validation requirements," although the *in camera* review caused this Court to seriously doubt the reliability of those two sources and whether they met the regulatory requirements for validation. All these concerns cause bring into question whether the original revalidation met minimal constitutional requirements.

Nevertheless, respondent indicates it has initiated a new revalidation process that is not yet complete. If only one source is required for revalidation, then it would appear that giving petitioner the process that was initially deprived may cure any defects in the previous revalidation process.

The matter is added to calendar on Friday, September 22, 2006, at 8:30 a.m. for a status review of the new revalidation process. If the parties wish to file additional Points and Authorities on the issue of the one-source requirement as it applies to this case or other issues related to the Court's comments herein, they may do so no later than September 15, 2006.

DATED: 7/24/06

WILLIAM H. FOLLETT,

Judge of the Superior Court

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HB-D&D